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This paper develops a proxy measure of the inequality of influence on the basis of survey 
evidence from 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
conducted among 6,500 firms in 27 transition countries. We refer to the resulting inequality 
as crony bias in the political system that can be measured at both the firm and country level. 
We examine the impact of crony bias at both the firm and country levels on three indicators 
of institutional subversion: 1) perceptions of and interaction with courts; 2) security of 
property rights; 3) tax compliance; and 4) bribery.  We find a consistent pattern in which the 
inequality of influence has a strongly negative impact on assessments of public institutions 
that ultimately affects the behavior of firms towards those institutions. Crony bias at both 
the firm and the country levels is associated with a significantly more negative assessment of 
the fairness and impartiality of courts and the enforceability of court decisions. Further, 
firms that report crony bias are significantly less likely to use courts to resolve business 
disputes. Such firms are shown to have less secure property rights than more influential 
firms. We also find that crony bias is associated with lower levels of tax compliance and 
significantly higher levels of bribery.  The evidence suggests that the inequality of influence 
not only damages the credibility of institutions among weak firms, but affects the likelihood 
that they will use and provide tax resources to support such institutions. By withholding tax 
revenues, paying bribes, and avoiding courts, these firms ensure that such state institutions 
are likely to remain weak and subject to capture by the more influential. The inequality of 
influence thus appears to generate a self-reinforcing dynamic in which institutions are 
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Introduction. 
 
There is now a substantial literature demonstrating the negative impact of inequality on 
economic growth and on a wide range of intermediate social and economic outcomes that 
affect growth.
1 Linking these results to another well-established literature – the quality of 
institutions – Glaeser, Scheinkman and Shleifer (2002) have argued that inequality affects 
growth by subverting the institutions that guarantee secure property rights. The rich can use 
their superior resources to manipulate political, legal and regulatory institutions to preserve 
and extend their privileged positions through inefficient redistributions, anti-competitive 
measures and other discriminatory practices. This subversion of institutions undermines the 
security of property rights for those less well-endowed and thus weakens investment and 
growth. Yet to the extent that inequality leads to the subversion of institutions, it is not 
necessarily through the inequality of wealth per se, but the inequality of influence, though 
the two are obviously closely inter-related.
2  The rich are assumed to be able to convert their 
greater wealth into greater political influence over both the formation and functioning of 
institutions. However, the extent to which inequalities of wealth can be converted into 
inequalities of influence will be mediated by different configurations of the political system. 
In order to understand the mechanisms linking inequality and growth, we need a much 
deeper investigation into the inequality of influence in developing countries. 
 
                                                 
1 The extensive theoretical literature on inequality and growth includes:  Aghion and Williamson (1998), 
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), Banerjee and Newman (1991, 1993), Benabou (1996a, 1996b, 2002), Murphy, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1989), Perotti (1993), Persson and Tabellini (1994), Piketty (1997), and Rajan and 
Zingales (2002). 
2  In addressing the puzzle of the empirical finding that economic growth per se does not lead to improved 
institutions and governance, Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), without delving into the issue of unequal 
influence in detail,  suggest that state capture (as elaborated below, a particular manifestation of influence), 
may be playing an important mediating role.      3
Building upon the extensive literature on special interest politics in developed countries, 
recent work has begun to examine the impact of the inequality of influence on economic 
performance, both at the macro- and micro-levels, with a particular focus on transition 
economies.
3 Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) use firm-level survey data to investigate 
the effects of different forms of influence activities on firm performance, emphasizing the 
strong gains to firms that engage in state capture, i.e. paying bribes to influence the basic laws, 
rules and regulations governing their activity. Slinko, Yakovlev and Zhuravskaya (2002) have 
created an extraordinary dataset identifying instances of preferential treatment for individual 
powerful firms in thousands of pieces of regional legislation in Russia to demonstrate how 
these preferences affect performance at the firm and the regional levels. The transition 
economies constitute an extremely rich set of cases for such research, since the simultaneous 
processes of economic liberalization, redistribution of state property and building the 
political, legal and regulatory institutions of a market economy place these inter-relationships 
into much sharper relief than in those countries with a more established institutional order. 
 
To date, empirical work on the inequality of influence has focused on identifying “winners” 
of the influence game and demonstrating the strong performance gains that such firms enjoy 
as a result. There is also some evidence suggesting that such inequalities do generate negative 
externalities in the form of less secure property rights and reduced sales growth for the less 
influential firms (Hellman, et. al. 2002) and higher barriers to entry for small firms and lower 
growth in regions where state capture is particularly pronounced (Slinko, et. al., 2002). 
                                                 
3 For previous work on transition countries, see Hellman (1997); Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000); 
Hellman and Schankerman (2000); and for an application to Russia, Hellman (2002). Similar arguments 
have been developed in the EBRD’s Transition Report (1999) and the World Bank’s (2002) retrospective 
on the first decade of transition. For an analysis of these dynamics on a much broader range of countries, 
see Kaufmann and Kraay (2002).   4
Nevertheless, we do not have a clear picture of the mechanisms by which the inequality of 
influence imposes costs to non-influential firms. If inequalities of influence lead to the 
subversion of institutions, then we should find differences in the performance and credibility 
of institutions among firms with different degrees of political influence. 
 
This paper develops a proxy measure of the inequality of influence on the basis of survey 
evidence from 2002 Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) 
conducted among 6,500 firms in 27 transition countries. Firms were asked to compare the 
influence of their collective representative, e.g. business or trade association, on recently 
enacted laws, rules or regulations that directly impacted their business with the influence of 
conglomerates, firms or individuals with close ties to political leaders.  
 
We refer to the resulting inequality as a perceived crony bias in the political system that can be 
measured at both the firm and country level. This measure gives us a crude indication of the 
extent to which firm managers believe that there are other actors with more or less influence 
than their own collective voice on the basic rules shaping their business environment. If 
managers believe that the rules of the game are biased in favor of political cronies, then this 
might be expected to have an impact on how they interact with public institutions, especially 
those whose reputation for impartiality is critical to their credibility and effectiveness. 
 
We examine the impact of crony bias at both the firm and country levels on three indicators 
of institutional subversion: 1) perceptions of and interaction with courts; 2) security of 
property rights; 3) tax compliance; and 4) bribery. Following Glaeser, Scheinkman and 
Shleifer (2002), we assume that courts are the public institution most susceptible to   5
subversion as a result of severe inequalities of influence, since their effectiveness is so closely 
based on expectations of impartiality and their ability to enforce decisions on all participants. 
Firms that perceive their environment as being sharply skewed in favor of more politically 
influential players are likely to have greater doubts that courts can render fair and impartial 
verdicts, as well as enforce such verdicts on more influential firms. As a result, such firms 
should have more negative perceptions of courts and be less likely to use them. This should, 
in turn, lead to greater insecurity of property rights among less influential firms. 
 
Tax compliance is a broader indicator of the subversion of public institutions as it reflects 
both the firm’s willingness to contribute to the development of public institutions as well as 
the effectiveness of the state’s capacity to collect taxes. Firms that perceive serious 
inequalities of influence should be less willing to contribute a share of their revenues to 
supporting state institutions that are biased in favor of a privileged few. Given the limited 
capacities of any state to enforce tax provisions, tax compliance becomes a much broader 
measure of confidence in state institutions. Bribery is also a good indicator of weak state 
institutions. 
 
We find a consistent pattern in which the inequality of influence has a strongly negative 
impact on assessments of public institutions that ultimately affects the behavior of firms 
towards those institutions. Crony bias at both the firm and the country levels is associated 
with a much more negative assessment of the fairness and impartiality of courts and the 
enforceability of court decisions, regardless of the firm’s actual interaction with the court 
system. Moreover, firms that do perceive a crony bias are significantly less likely to use 
courts to resolve business disputes. Such firms are shown to have less secure property rights   6
than more influential firms. We also find that crony bias is associated with lower levels of tax 
compliance and significantly higher levels of bribery. 
 
The evidence suggests that the inequality of influence not only damages the credibility of 
institutions among weak firms, but affects the likelihood that they will use and provide tax 
resources to support such institutions. By withholding tax revenues, paying bribes, and 
avoiding courts, these firms ensure that such state institutions are likely to remain weak and 
subject to capture by more influential firms and individuals. The inequality of influence thus 
appears to generate a self-reinforcing dynamic in which institutions are subverted further 




The BEEPS questionnaire for the transition economies was developed jointly by the World 
Bank and the Office of the Chief Economist at the EBRD. The survey was conducted on 
the basis of face-to-face interviews with high-level firm managers or owners through site 
visits by local surveyors trained according to a standardized methodology. The first round of 
BEEPS was conducted at over 4000 firms during the period June through August 1999 in 25 
transition countries. The second round of BEEPS was conducted at nearly 6500 firms in the 
first half of 2002 in all of the transition economies except Turkmenistan,
4 as well as in 
Turkey. This papers makes use of only data from the second-round survey as the questions 
driving the analysis of influence were not included in the first-round survey instrument. 
 
                                                 
4 The survey was terminated mid-course in Turkmenistan due to political harassment of the local survey 
firm.   7
In each country, between 150 and 500 firms were interviewed based on the size of their 
economies. The sample was structured to be fairly representative of the domestic economies 
with specific quotas placed on size, sector, location, and export orientation. 
 
The BEEPS survey instrument is structured around multiple objectives: 1) to measure 
managers’ perceptions of the investment climate and their interactions with the state; 2) to 
develop quantitative indicators of various obstacles to business and aspects of market 
structure based on the direct experiences of firms, and 3) to obtain simple measures of firm 
performance across a variety of dimensions that can then be related back to varying 
perceptions and experiences. 
 
Measuring the inequality of influence 
 
To develop a proxy measure for the inequality of influence, we rely on a question in the 
survey designed to ask firms about the relative influence of different actors on the 
development of laws, rules and regulations. In the survey, firms were asked: “How much 
influence do you think the following groups actually had on recently enacted national laws, 
rules and regulations that have a substantial impact on your business?” It is important to 
note that the question is structured not just to ask about all laws and regulations, but just 
those directly affecting their business. Of course, firms cannot be expected to know the 
actual level of influence of different groups on legislation; the question simply elicits their 
perceptions of the gaps in influence. Their answers are expected to be more a function of 
their larger world view than their detailed knowledge of the legislative process. 
   8
After assessing their own influence, firms were asked in direct succession to compare the 
influence of a large set of other actors including: your domestic competitors, foreign firms, 
your business association, other business associations, dominant firms or conglomerates in 
key sectors of the economy (other than yours), labor unions, organized crime, regional or 
local government, military, international development agencies or foreign governments, and 
individuals or firms with close personal ties to political leaders. For each category, firms 
could select from a 0-4 range with 0=no impact and 4=decisive influence. 
 
Factor analysis suggests a clear pattern across these institutions, as reported in Table 1. The 
first two factor loadings explain the dominant share of the variation in a pattern that might 
be called an “us vs. them” perception of the inequality of influence. Not surprisingly, firms 
lump most of the institutions listed above into the “them” category with a particularly high 
correlation among foreign firms, other business associations, dominant firms in other 
sectors, international development agencies and individuals or firms with close ties to 
political leaders. More surprising is who the firms consider in the “us” category, i.e. the 
second factor loading. Given the concerns often expressed about the uneven playing field 
for competition in transition countries, one might have expected firms to see their domestic 
competitors as more influential than themselves, i.e. that their business rivals take advantage 
of political influence to gain competitive advantages. But instead, firms see a reasonably high 
correlation between their own influence and that of their competitors in contrast to 
everyone else. Firms seem to be making a distinction between the political playing field in 
which their influence relative to the other players is quite small and their own competitive 
playing field where their political influence is not substantially different than their 
competitors.   9
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
To measure the inequality of influence in the broader political playing field, we identify the 
extent of  crony bias as perceived by the firm as the difference between the firm’s 
characterization of the influence of individuals or firms with close, personal ties to political 
leaders and the influence of its own business or trade association on recently enacted laws, 
rules and regulations affecting their business. Given that the majority of the firms in the 
BEEPS sample are small and medium sized enterprises – though there is a quota of 15 
percent of the sample in each country for firms over 250 workers – we chose to compare the 
power of political cronies to some collective representative of the firms rather than their 
own individual influence. However, the results reported below are not substantially different 
if we use an index of crony bias based upon the firm’s own influence. 
 
Crony bias scores are calculated for each firm ranging from values of  -4 to 4 with 0 
suggesting equal influence and negative scores indicating firms who see their collective 
representatives as more influential than political cronies. The distribution of crony bias 
scores across the sample is shown in Chart 1. Only 16 percent of the firms in the sample 
assessed the influence of their business association as greater than that of individuals or 
firms with close ties to political leaders. Nearly 40 percent of the firms did not report any 
inequality of influence between their business associations and political cronies. Of the 
remaining 44 percent firms that did report an inequality of influence, there is considerable 
variation in the extent of this perceived inequality. 
   10
[Chart 1 about here] 
 
There is not a strong correlation between the crony bias score and any standard firm 
characteristics. Not surprisingly, the strongest correlation is with firm size, as firms with a 
larger number of employees tend to perceive a lower crony bias (r=-0.10). Crony bias is also 
negatively, but weakly, correlated with state ownership (r=-0.06). Across the sample, there is 
no significant correlation between sectors and crony bias. The inequality of influence does 
not appear to be strongly driven by basic firm-level characteristics. 
 
We can also the aggregate the firm-level crony bias scores to construct country level 
aggregates for the perceived inequality of influence. These country averages are presented in 
Chart 2.
5 There is considerable variation in the extent of crony bias across the transition 
economies. It is interesting to note that at the low end of the crony bias scale are both some 
of the most democratic (Slovenia, Estonia, the Czech Republic, Lithuania) and some of the 
least democratic (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan) countries in 
the region. Slovenia stands out as the only country in which firms see their business 
associations exceed the influence of political cronies (and hence the negative crony bias). In 
contrast, Poland is a significant outlier in comparison with all the transition countries and, in 
particular, with the other more advanced, democratic reformers. Though the influence of the 
firms’ business association in Poland is on par with other countries in the region, the 
                                                 
5 We could create these indices by dividing the influence of political cronies and competitors by the firm’s 
own influence and that of it’s business association, but this would lose valuable information about the 
overall level of influence perceived across the transition countries. Nevertheless, we have tested this 
alternative version of the indices on all the results presented in this paper and found similar, albeit 
occasionally less robust, effects.    11
perceived influence of political cronies is extremely high exceeding all other countries in the 
sample. 
 
[Chart 2 about here] 
 
For comparative purposes, Chart 2 also presents the country averages of another form of 
inequality of influence: the difference between the firm’s own influence and that of its direct 
competitors, which we refer to as competitor bias. At the firm level, these is a positive, but 
weak, correlation between the competitor bias and crony bias (r=0.08). Inequalities 
associated with crony bias are generally seen as more significant across the region than 
competitor bias, as might be expected. But surprisingly, these biases are not correlated across 
countries. At the country level, there would appear to be different dynamics shaping 
perceptions of the inequality of influence in different dimensions of the firm’s experience. 
Firms shape their views about the inequality of influence at higher levels of the political 
system independently of their views about the inequality of influence in their own 
competitive playing fields.  
 
Though these patterns are interesting at the country level – and we will later try to link them 
to measures of institutional quality – the main challenge is to link these perceptions of the 
environment to the actual behavior of firms. If perceptions of the inequality of influence 
play a role in subverting institutions, then we should see firms act differently according to 
their perceptions of these inequalities. For this, we turn to a firm-level analysis. 
   12
The inequality of influence and the subversion of courts 
 
If the quality of any institution is likely to be susceptible to the impact of the inequality of 
influence, it is the courts. The effectiveness of courts is predicated to a large extent on their 
fairness and impartiality. If individuals can take advantage of inequalities of political and 
economic power to unduly influence courts, their fairness and impartiality can be 
undermined.  
 
The link between the inequality of influence and the subversion of institutions such as courts 
should be highly dependent upon perceptions of both the extent of such inequality and of 
the institution. If individuals perceive that the political or economic playing field is skewed 
by severe inequalities of influence, then they are likely to be more concerned about the 
likelihood of receiving fair and impartial treatment through institutions susceptible to such 
influence. This should, in turn, affect their behavior in terms of their use of courts to settle 
disputes and to enforce their property rights. 
 
The BEEPS survey incorporates questions on the perceptions of courts and the use of 
courts. This provides an opportunity to test empirically the extent to which the inequality of 
influence subverts the effectiveness of courts in transition economies, as well as the impact 
on the security of property rights. 
 
Firms were asked to assess the following attributes of the court system in their countries in 
resolving business disputes: 1) fairness and impartiality; 2) honesty and incorruptibility; and 
3) ability to enforce decisions. They could choose from a scale of 1-6, in which 1 denotes   13
that such attributes “never” apply to the court system and 6 denotes that such attributes 
“always” apply. We run separate regressions on each of the three attributes of the court 
system listed above. Crony bias is included in two forms – the individual firm score and the 
country average – to determine the impact of such bias at both levels. Since the firm’s 
assessment of courts will also be affected by its experience of interacting with courts, we add 
a dummy variable (court exposure) if the firm identified itself as either a plaintiff or defendant 
in a civil or commercial arbitration court in the three year period covered by the survey. Just 
of over 37 percent of the firms in the sample used the court system in this period.
6 We 
include an interaction term between crony bias at the country level and court exposure 
(Crony bias*court) to see if the experience of interaction with courts has a different impact 
in countries with higher levels of inequality of influence. This will also allow us to determine 
if crony bias has an impact on perceptions of the court even for firms that do not use the 
courts. Included in the regressions are control variables for firm size, sector, and ownership 
(state vs. private), as well as country fixed effects. The results are presented in Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Firms who see a higher level of bias towards political cronies have a consistently more 
negative assessment of all attributes of the court system. In addition, higher average scores 
on crony bias at the country level have a strong negative impact on perceptions of the 
fairness and honesty/incorruptibility of the courts across all firms in the country. The 
country level effects of high crony bias are particularly pronounced on the perceptions of the 
                                                 
6 This number itself is revealing, especially given that fact that most of the firms in the sample are small 
and medium sized enterprises and that the question only covered the period from January 2000 until the 
survey in early 2002. Given the low regard that many in the region hold the court system, it is still actively 
used.   14
honesty/incorruptibility of the court system: a one standard deviation increase in the country 
crony bias average is associated with a quarter point fall in the assessment of the honest of 
the court system. It is important to note that the negative impact of crony bias holds 
regardless of the firm’s exposure to the court system.  
 
Exposure to courts does bring some small improvement in the assessment of the fairness of 
courts, though for the honesty and enforceability dimensions this has only borderline 
significance. Yet exposure to courts has the opposite effect on perceptions of the 
enforceability of court decisions in countries with a high level of country bias, as evidenced 
by the significant negative coefficient on the interaction term (crony country avg * court). 
Those firms that do have experience with courts in crony-dominated systems are even more 
pessimistic that the courts are able to enforce their decisions. 
 
So far, the results have linked measures of underlying inequalities of influence to perceptions 
about the various attributes of courts. Yet to the extent that such  perceptions subvert 
institutions, they need to be linked to some aspect of firm behavior. One would expect that 
perceptions of the credibility of courts influence the likelihood that firms will use courts to 
resolve disputes. To measure the propensity to use courts, we use a modified variable from 
the court exposure variable included in the regressions above. Instead of exposure to courts 
as both a plaintiff and a defendant, we define a dummy variable court use based exclusively on 
whether the firm had ever been a plaintiff in a court case. Being a plaintiff implies a 
voluntary decision to bring a case to court that entails costs and is thus a better measure of 
the extent to which a firm is inclined to use courts to resolve disputes. The probit model 
reported in the last column of Table 2 uses the same specifications as the previous   15
regressions without the court exposure variable and the interaction term. The results show 
that in countries with a high crony bias, all firms are less likely to use courts to resolve 
business disputes. In addition, firms that perceive the business environment as skewed 
towards political cronies are even less likely to make use of courts. The inequality of 
influence undermines the credibility of courts and, in so doing, deters firms from using 
courts. This should only serve to further weaken the courts and increase their susceptibility 
to undue influence from more powerful firms. 
 
These regressions suggest that the inequality of influence is associated not only with lower 
perceptions of the credibility of the court system, but also with the firm’s behavior in its 
willingness to use the courts. Perceptions and behavior are closely inter-related and mutually 
reinforcing. 
 
If the courts cannot be relied upon to adjudicate disputes impartially and honestly and are 
subject to manipulation by influential firms, then the security of property and contract rights 
for all should be diminished, but especially for non-influential firms. This can be tested using 
the survey results. Managers were asked to what degree they agree with the statement: “I am 
confident that the legal system will uphold my contract and property rights in business 
disputes.” Again, respondents could choose from a 1-6 scale with 1 = “never” and 6 = 
“always”. Using the same specification as the court attributes regressions, we find that crony 
bias at the firm level has a significant negative impact on the firm’s security of property 
rights, though the country-level effects of crony bias are not significant. Exposure to courts 
in general does not increase the security of property rights for firms. Indeed, for firms that   16
have used courts in countries with a high level of crony bias, the security of property rights is 
even lower.  
 
These results suggest some insights into how the  inequality of influence can subvert 
institutions. The effectiveness of courts in guaranteeing property rights is based on the 
credibility among potential court users that the courts can be expected to make decisions in a 
fair and honest manner and that such decisions can be enforced on all participants, 
regardless of any differences in their economic strength or political influence. Yet in 
countries where firms on average see a significant inequality of influence, the firms are much 
less likely to place credibility in these attributes of the court system, irregardless of their 
direct interaction with the court system. In other words, crony bias systematically weakens 
firm’s perceptions of the credibility of the courts. While direct exposure to courts does 
mitigate these negative perceptions at least with regards to the fairness of courts, it actually 
exacerbates the problem with the enforceability of court decisions. Firms who do use courts 
in countries with a high inequality of influence find that these courts are less able to enforce 
their decisions. Experience thus reinforces perceptions further weakening the credibility of 
courts. The result is that the inequality of influence creates disincentives for firms to use the 
courts with negative implications for the security of their property rights. This is largely 




   17
To bribe or pay tax? 
 
Perceptions of the inequality of influence should not only affect attitudes and behavior 
towards the courts, since one’s view of all state institutions should be, to some extent, 
affected by the extent to which they are anticipated to make decisions and provide services 
in an impartial, honest and reliable manner. One possible indicator of firm managers’ 
broader attitudes towards state institutions is their willingness to pay taxes.
7 If a manager 
believes that the inequality of influence subverts the functioning of all state institutions than 
she should be less willing to p ay taxes to support state institutions that are skewed to 
someone else’s advantages. If the inequality of influence does lead managers to conceal more 
of their revenue from tax authorities and, hence, reduce the state’s tax revenue, then such 
behavior might further subvert the effectiveness of state institutions. 
 
While tax compliance is obviously a difficult phenomenon to measure, previous business 
surveys have had some success in estimating relative compliance levels across countries. The 
BEEPS survey asks managers the following question: “Recognizing the difficulties that many 
firms face in fully complying with taxes and regulations, what percent of total annual sales 
would you estimate the typical firm in your area of business reports for tax purposes?”
8 On 
the basis of this question, we develop a tax compliance variable and measure the impact of 
different types of inequality of influence. Tax compliance rates should also be affected by the 
level of tax rates, problems of tax administration, and the performance of firms. To measure 
                                                 
7 In the transition economies, such a decision has much more of an element of choice than obligation, as in 
other countries with more effective tax enforcement mechanisms. 
8 The assumption, of course, is that firms base their estimate on their own practices. The evidence presented 
in this paper that firms do not see a vast gap between themselves and their direct competitors (i.e. “the 
typical firm in your area of business”) suggests this assumption is not implausible.   18
the impact of tax rates and tax administration, we add variables created from the firm’s own 
assessment of the extent that tax rates and tax administration represent a problem for the 
operation and growth of their business measured on a 1-4 scale, with 1=no obstacle and 
4=major obstacle. To measure firm performance, we include a variable indicating the 
percentage change in sales in real terms from 1998-2001. We also include the standard 
controls for firm characteristics and country fixed effects. The results are reported in Table 
3. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
As might be expected, firm managers that see high tax rates as more of a problem for their 
business report less their of annual sales for tax purposes. Neither the firm’s own sales 
growth nor problems associated with tax administration (though this is highly correlated 
with the tax rates variable) have a significant impact on tax compliance.  
 
Higher levels of crony bias at both the country and the firm levels are associated with lower 
rates of tax compliance. At the firm level, a one standard deviation increase in the crony bias 
score leads to a one percentage point decrease in tax compliance. The impact of crony bias 
at the country level is greater with a one standard deviation in the country average score 
leading to a nearly two percentage point decline in tax compliance across all firms in the 
country.  
 
The relationship between the inequality of influence and tax compliance would appear to 
reinforce the underlying imbalance of power that subverts institutions. If firms pay less in   19
taxes in countries where they believe that political cronies subvert state institutions, then it 
ensures that such institutions will remain weak (through low pay, low investment, low 
capacity, etc.) and, therefore, more subject to capture and political influence.  
 
In addition to taxes, there are other payments that firms make to state officials, namely 
bribes. How does the inequality of influence affect the other main flow of transfers from 
firms to the state? BEEPS provides a detailed picture of the extent and the types of bribery 
across the region.
9 One would expect inequalities of influence to increase the incidence of 
corruption, and hence bribery, since this is one of the main mechanisms by which such 
inequalities are created. Firms invest in influence, just as they invest in other assets, to secure 
advantages arising from the legal, regulatory and distributional powers of the state. At the 
same time, existing inequalities of influence could lead state officials to target weak firms. In 
either case, the inequality of influence should be associated with higher levels of corruption. 
 
We look at two different aspects of corruption: 1) the extent of unofficial payments and gifts 
to public officials as a percent of the firm’s annual sales revenues and 2) the frequency of 
unofficial payments and gifts to public officials in a given year. Corruption should be a 
function of certain firm characteristics, such as size, ownership, and sector, as previous work 
has shown. We also add two more dynamic variables – amount of senior management time 
spent with government officials and firm sales growth. Corruption is often linked to the 
extent of intervention by bureaucrats at the firm level, so the government “time tax” on 
management should lead to higher corruption. Firms that perform well are more likely to 
attract the attention of predatory officials. Finally, we test for the impact of crony bias at the 
                                                 
9 For more on this issue using the first round of BEEPS, see Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann (2000) and 
World Bank (2000).   20
firm and country level on the extent and frequency of corruption. The results are reported in 
Table 4. 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results are consistent across both regressions. As previous studies have shown, state-
owned and large firms consistently pay less of their revenues in unofficial payments and 
make such payments less frequently than smaller, private firms. Senior management time 
spent with government is associated with a greater level and frequency of corruption 
payments. Firm performance has on corruption levels. Firms perceiving a high inequality of 
influence pay more in corruption as a share of their revenue and pay more frequently. 
Moreover, in countries where the average level of crony bias is high, firms again pay more 
bribes, more frequently. The effects at both the firm and the country level are quite 
substantial. A one standard deviation increase in the crony bias country average increases the 
mean “bribe tax” on all firms by nearly 15 percent. Similarly, a one standard deviation 
increase in the firm’s crony bias score increases it’s mean bribe tax by an additional 12 
percent. 
 
The results in Table 4 also suggest that firms which perceive themselves as more influential 
(i.e. with a negative crony bias score) pay a smaller share of their revenues in corruption and 
pay less frequently. 
 
There are several p ossible interpretations for the causal link between the inequality of 
influence and corruption. One possible interpretation is that predatory officials prey upon   21
weak firms extracting greater bribes from them, while influential firms can use their power to 
shield themselves from such demands. Such behavior on the part of officials would then 
exacerbate the firms’ perception of inequalities. Another possible interpretation is that firms 
choose to bribe on the basis of their perceptions about inequalities in  the broader 
environment. Less influential firms may bribe more because they are seeking to redress these 
power imbalances rooted in the greater size, employment or personal political connections 
of influential firms. It is also possible that influential firms are just better bribers, getting 
more influence with a lower overall investment in corruption. 
 
Surely, the causal relationship goes in both directions. It is important to note, however, that 
the impact of these perceptions about the inequality of influence have an additional impact 
on the level and frequency of corruption even beyond such differences in firm characteristics 
as size and ownership that might be expected to affect the extent to which firms are preyed 
upon by predatory state officials.  
 
These results suggest that the inequality of influence affects not only the perception and use 
of courts, but influences more broadly the firm’s relationship to the state. At lower levels of 
the inequality of influence, firms are more willing to invest in supporting state institutions 
through their tax contributions. At higher levels of inequality, firms are more likely to invest 
in bribery of individual public officials – either to gain advantages or to protect themselves – 
rather than in the support of state institutions. Naturally, such behavior further reinforces 
the weakness of state institutions in highly unequal environments. 
   22
Impact on firm performance 
 
If the inequality of influence subverts state institutions, then it should affect the performance 
of all firms in highly unequal environments. By subverting courts, undermining tax revenues, 
and weakening the security of contract and property rights, significant inequalities of 
influence should reduce overall growth performance at the country level, even as it generates 
concentrated advantages for particular firms with close ties to political authorities. If so, then 
we need to turn to an examination of the effects of such inequalities at the country level to 
identify the externalities associated with varying levels of crony bias across countries.  
 
Given the impact on of the inequality of influence on the security of property rights and the 
quality of public institutions, we would expect this to have a negative impact on the firm’s 
investments in restructuring. Restructuring is a form of investment of financial and human 
capital that should be quite sensitive not only to the security of property and contract rights, 
but to distortions in market structure that might limit or otherwise distort competition. Like 
all other forms of investment, the potential benefits of restructuring will be heavily 
discounted if there are significant risks that property rights and associated returns are subject 
to unpredictable expropriation by the state or by other powerful competitors. Moreover, if 
state institutions intervene in the economy to provide selective advantages to favored firms 
and to erect all sorts of barriers to market entry and competition, then firms might be wiser 
to invest in trying to influence or capture state institutions than in restructuring to improve 
performance. Even influential firms that enjoy considerable rents as a result of their capacity 
to capture the state are likely to face less substantial market pressures or other incentives to   23
engage in restructuring. As a result, high levels of inequality of influence at the country level 
should have a negative impact on restructuring for all firms. 
 
The BEEPS data provide evidence on a wide variety of restructuring activities, such as 
changing suppliers  and customers, developing new products, opening new plants, in-
sourcing or out-sourcing production activities, forging new partnerships and exporting to 
new markets – 14 different activities in all. On the basis of these questions, we can develop 
an unweighted index of restructuring at the firm level measuring the likelihood that firms 
have engaged in any of these activities during the period 1998-2001. Then we can test for the 
impact of the inequality of influence at the country level on restructuring, controlling for a 
variety of firm level factors. 
 
In addition to the standard firm level characteristics, we expect the propensity to engage in 
restructuring to be influenced by the pressures of competition as seen by the firm and by 
their perceptions of the investment climate. The measure of the investment climate is based 
on the extent to which a wide range of factors in the areas of finance, infrastructure, 
regulation, macroeconomic instability, and the rule of law are seen by the firm to pose 
obstacles for the operation and growth of their business. Competition is measured by two 
variables – price elasticity of demand and competitive pressure. The price elasticity is based 
on a question assessing the likely response from customers of a 10 percent increase in the 
price of the firm’s main line of products or services.
10 An index of competitive pressure is 
based on the firm’s assessment of pressure from a wider range of sources, such as domestic 
and foreign competitors, customers, creditors, and shareholders on decisions to develop new 
                                                 
10 Responses could range from continuing to buy from us in the same quantities, at slightly lower 
quantities, at much lower quantities, or buy from our competitors instead.   24
products/services and markets as well as to reduce production costs.
11 Finally, we also add a 
variable denoting the age of the firm, since the propensity to engage restructuring might also 
be related to the lifecycle of firms. The results are presented in Table 5.  
 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Regarding firm characteristics, it is not surprising that larger firms and those in 
manufacturing and industry are more likely to engage in restructuring than smaller firms in 
the retail and trade sectors. That state ownership does not have a statistically significant 
effect on the propensity to engage in restructuring is particularly interesting, suggesting 
perhaps that sharper differences with privatized firms in the earlier years of transition are 
beginning to weaken over time. Older firms are also less likely to restructure, perhaps 
reflecting the fact that the bulk of their restructuring was accomplished at an earlier stage of 
the transition. Firms that cite greater pressure from competitors, customers, creditors and 
shareholders are significantly more likely to restructure. 
 
As expected, firms that cite a higher level of crony bias are less likely to invest in 
restructuring. An uneven playing field skewed in favor of political cronies creates 
disincentives for uninfluential firms to make long-term investments in restructuring their 
business. 
 
Political institutions and the inequality of influence 
                                                 
11 Firms were asked to assess the importance of pressure from each of the actors described above on a 1-4 
scale with 1=not at all important to 4=very important on the decisions to introduce new products and to 
reduce production costs separately. An unwieghted average of these components is used to develop the 
index.   25
 
The inequality of influence is clearly generated by and a continuing function of existing 
political institutions. One could suggest a very long list of specific institutions, laws, 
regulations, and practices that shape the market for influence across countries.
12 Our 
understanding of what shapes inequalities of influence in developing countries is at a 
particularly early stage. Though explaining why countries have different levels of crony bias 
is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth pointing out some initial, speculative 
relationships between broad regime types and the inequality of influence. 
 
In reviewing the country averages for crony bias across the transition countries, an 
interesting pattern emerges.  The lowest crony bias averages are in some of the most 
democratic and least democratic regimes in the region. Indeed, Chart 3 shows a simple 
correlation between the average crony bias and a standard measure of  democratic political 
regimes, the Freedom House political liberties index for the period 1998-2001, suggests a 
bell-shaped curve. We could speculate that political inclusion and participation mitigate 
severe inequalities of influence in more democratic systems, while political exclusion in 
personalistic dictatorships ensures that most actors outside the government are equally 
uninfluential. In general, perceived inequalities of political influence are greatest in those 
countries with partial political reforms, what some are referring to as “semi-authoritarian 
regimes” or “managed democracies” (though this gives us some picture of how firms would 
answer the question “managed by whom?”). Such regimes might be liberal enough to allow 
some competition for political influence, but the market for influence is still highly 
segmented and distorted with significant entry barriers and monopolistic practices. 
                                                 
12 A good starting point to review the many factors that affect special interest politics is Grossman and 
Helpman (2001). Becker (1983) also takes a very broad and comprehensive approach to this issue.   26
 
[Insert Chart 3 here] 
 
This relationship between political regimes and the inequality of influence extends beyond 
the transition economies.  Data from about 5,000 firms from the global Survey of 
Executives carried out for the Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) for 2002/3, with a 
much broader coverage of 80 countries, allow us to construct a similar crony bias index and 
relate it to regime type in a larger sample of countries.  Chart 4 plots the crony bias index in 
the GCS survey with a broad measure of political voice and accountability from the 
“governance matters” database (Kaufmann and Kray 2002). The same bell-shaped 
relationship holds across this large group of countries.
13 
 
[Insert Chart 4 here] 
 
Though these simple correlations are very speculative, they suggest that we need to explore 
further how different regimes of competition, voice and accountability shape the market for 
influence in developing countries. It is clear that political competition itself does not prevent 
the development of severe inequalities of influence. Rather, we need to understand how 
different rules, regulations and practices generate a robust and reasonably transparent 
competition for political influence in developing countries.   
                                                 
13 The preliminary nature of the exposition of the global results based on the survey for the GCR is due to 
this data being still under analysis.  Initial analysis suggest that, consistent with the results on transition 
based on the BEEPS survey detailed above, the evidence from global survey for the GCR indicate that  
where crony bias is more prevalent, the judiciary, property rights protection and tax compliance are 
significantly more likely to be subverted.  For the country average results, Chart 5 is indicative (similarly 
strong and robust statistical results emerge from firm-level regressions with similar controls as with the 
BEEPS dataset, not shown here).  These and further materials based on this survey will be incorporated in 
the next version of this paper.  For details on this worldwide firm-level dataset and its analysis, see also the 




In this paper, we have tried to explore empirically the mechanisms through which inequality 
affects growth. Building on recent work on state capture and the subversion of institutions, 
we have focused on how the inequality can undermine the credibility of institutions that  
provide critical public goods such as the security of property rights. But instead of using 
traditional measures of the inequality of income or wealth, we began to explore inequalities 
of influence which should be of first-order concern in explaining the efforts of powerful 
firms or groups to manipulate the formation and functioning of institutions.  With survey 
data, we proposed a measure of the skewness of the playing field towards individuals and 
firms with close ties to political leaders as opposed to business or trade associations 
representing broader sector or regional interests.  Though based on perceptions of firms, 
such a measure provides an interesting proxy for inequalities of influence that are difficult to 
observe on the basis of simple firm characteristics. 
 
With BEEPS survey data on the quality of institutions, the security of property rights and 
key aspects of firm performance, we explored the impact of crony bias on the credibility of 
courts, the use of courts, tax compliance, corruption and the propensity of firms to 
restructure. We found that firms who perceive a strong crony bias in the broader political 
environment relative to their own collective voice have greater doubts about the fairness and 
impartiality of courts and their ability to enforce decisions on all participants.  But the 
negative impact goes beyond perceptions to affect firm behavior, as less influential firms are 
less likely to use courts, more likely to evade taxes, and more likely to pay bribes. Moreover,   28
the additional negative impact of crony bias at the country level suggests that the subversion 
of institutions associated with this inequality of influence imposes negative externalities on 
all firms in crony-dominated countries. By weakening the security of property rights for less 
influential firms, crony bias reduces the  incentives for firms to make longer-term 
investments in a broad range of restructuring activities.  Several studies of firm performance 
in transition economies have emphasized the importance of restructuring to growth (Carlin, 
Fries, and Schaeffer, 2000; World Bank 2001). 
 
A preliminary analysis of the relationship between political regime types and the inequality of 
influence suggests that we need to explore further what is driving the structure of the market 
for influence in developing countries. Though this paper focused mostly on an analysis and 
data from the transition economies, additional data from a broader survey (for the GCR) 
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Table 1: The components of influence 
Factor  Eigen 
value 
Difference  Proportion  Cumulative       
1  4.40837  3.07033  0.7878  0.7878       
2  1.33804  0.90107  0.2391  1.0269       
3  0.43697  0.17673  0.0781  1.105       
4  0.26024  0.17962  0.0465  1.1515       
5  0.08062  0.04875  0.0144  1.1659       
6  0.03187  0.06691  0.0057  1.1716       
7  -0.03505  0.05475  -0.0063  1.1654       
8  -0.0898  0.02361  -0.016  1.1493       
9  -0.11341  0.02046  -0.0203  1.129       
10  -0.13387  0.04679  -0.0239  1.1051       
11  -0.18066  0.0127  -0.0323  1.0728       
12  -0.19336  0.02087  -0.0346  1.0383       
13  -0.21422  .  -0.0383  1       
               
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6  Uniqueness 
Your firm  0.17768  0.549  0.0368  0.16592  0.07723  0.07225  0.62696 
Your domestic 
competitors  0.33712  0.64241  0.19405  0.02744  0.03139  0.00986  0.43417 
Other domestic 
firms  0.55908  0.46891  0.16274  -0.10215  -0.0708  -0.04851  0.42327 
Foreign Firms  0.64158  0.06815  0.12106  -0.23158  -0.0931  0.0514  0.50414 
Your business 
association  0.53741  0.25213  -0.37583  -0.00001  0.0717  0.00728  0.50117 
Other business 
associations  0.68998  0.11389  -0.34648  -0.07446  -0.00519  -0.04488  0.38332 
Dominant firms 
in other sectors  0.75204  -0.11997  0.02021  -0.17516  0.02056  -0.03467  0.38733 
Labor unions  0.60607  -0.07417  -0.14084  0.18842  -0.11482  0.0102  0.55855 
Organized crime  0.58656  -0.23932  0.21711  0.10659  -0.00652  -0.04167  0.53839 
Regional gov’t  0.52194  -0.03947  0.05048  0.22815  0.02768  -0.06775  0.66606 
Military  0.53038  -0.16287  0.02344  0.17469  -0.11158  0.04427  0.6467 
Individuals/ 
firms with close 
ties to political 
leaders  0.6892  -0.3023  0.1581  -0.00983  0.16045  -0.00947  0.38268 
Development 
agencies or 
foreign gov’ts  0.68441  -0.35533  -0.00658  -0.04617  0.04698  0.09902  0.39114   30
 
Table 2: The inequality of influence and the court system 
   Fair  Honest 
Enforce 
decisions  Court Use 
Security of 
Property Rights 
Crony bias  
(firm level)  -0.07  -0.09  -0.06  -0.02  -0.10 
    (-5.17 )***  (-6.23)***  (-4.54)***  (-1.56)*  (-7.50)*** 
Crony bias 
(country avg)      -0.36  -0.70  0.03  -1.01  0.06 
  (-2.21)**  (-4.17)***  (0.16)  (-6.14)***  (0.37) 
Court exposure  0.15  0.12  0.11    -0.01 
  (1.72)**  (1.36)  (1.26)    (-0.17) 
Crony bias 
(country avg) 
*court exp  -0.13  -0.10  -0.38    -0.18 
  (-1.17)  (-0.87)  (-3.22)***    (-1.62)* 
State-owned  0.29  0.32  0.26  0.03  0.25 
  (4.67)***  (4.91)***  (3.95)***  (0.53)  (3.96)*** 
Size  0.11  0.11  0.08  0.22  0.08 
  (7.31)**  (7.29)***  (5.41)***  (15.54)***  (5.37)*** 
Sector dummies  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes 
Country dummies  yes  yes  yes  Yes  yes 
Constant  2.47  2.52  2.98  -0.64  3.14 
  (11.36)***  (11.43)***  (12.87)***  (-3.10)***  (14.57)*** 
R-squared  0.10  0.11  0.10 
0.13 (pseudo-
R2)  0.09 
Observations  4340  4281  4306  4692  4483 
Model  OLS  OLS  OLS  Probit  OLS 
 
t statistics in parentheses 
*sig at 10%; **sig at 5%; ***sig at 1% 
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Table 3: The inequality of influence and tax compliance 
  Tax compliance   
Crony bias (firm level)  -0.60   
  (-2.43)***   
Crony bias (country avg)  -4.86   
  (-1.96)**   
Tax rates  -1.41   
  (-2.86)***   
Tax administration  -0.34   
  (-0.71)   
Sales growth  0.002   
  (0.41)   
State-owned  5.37   
  (4.73)***   
Size  1.59   
  (6.17)***   
Sector dummies  Yes   
Country dummies  Yes   
Constant  80.75   
  (20.59)***   
R-squared  0.13   
Observations  3981   
     
t statistics in parentheses     
*sig at 10%; **sig at 5%; ***sig at 1%    
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Table 4: The inequality of influence and corruption 
  Bribe share  Bribe frequency 
Management time spent w/ state  0.03  0.02 
  (7.86)***  (8.35)*** 
Sales growth  -0.0005  -0.0002 
  (-0.80)  (-0.48) 
Crony bias (firm level)  0.12  0.14 
  (3.82)***  (9.37)*** 
Crony bias (country average)  0.58  0.45 
  (1.77)**  (3.18)*** 
State-owned  -1.00  -0.72 
  (-6.73)***  (-10.56)*** 
Size  -0.17  -0.03 
  (-5.03)***  (-1.65)* 
Sector  Yes  yes 
Country dummies  Yes  yes 
Constant  2.19  2.54 
  (4.43)***  (11.16)*** 
R-squared  0.12  0.15 
Observations  4009  4089 
     
t statistics in parentheses     
*sig at 10%; **sig at 5%; ***sig at 1%     
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Table 5: The determinants of restructuring 
Crony bias (firm level)  -0.05   
  (-2.04)**   
Investment climate (firm level)  0.36   
  (4.13)***   
Price elasticity of demand  -0.16   
  (-4.89)***   
Pressure  0.32   
  (5.23)***   
State-owned  -0.003   
  (-0.14)   
Size  0.22   
  (8.52)***   
Age  0.004   
  (1.84)*   
Sector dummies  yes   
Country dummies  yes   
Constant  -28.07   
  (-6.86)***   
R-squared  0.17   
Observations  2957   
     
t statistics in parentheses     
*sig at 10%; **sig at 5%; ***sig at 1%       
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Competitor Bias Crony Bias  36






























Chart 4: Crony bias vs. democratic voice and accountability  






























Chart 5: Tax compliance vs. crony bias 
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